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SUBJECT: NEPAL: INDIA SUPPORTS UN ROLE IN MAOIST DDR BUT IS CAUTIOUS ABOUT UNSC INVOLVEMENT

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1576

[¶](#)B. KATHMANDU 1617

[¶](#)1. (SBU) Summary. Indian Mission to the UN diplomat Harsh Shringla told Poloff June 20 that while his government supports the early establishment of a UN mission in Nepal to monitor Maoist disarmament, New Delhi would greatly prefer to avoid adding Nepal to the UNSC agenda for discussion -- lest it set a precedent for broader UNSC involvement in other regional conflicts such as Kashmir. He expressed hope that either the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal could expand its mandate to include arms monitoring, or if UNSC authorization is required, that the Council could adopt a Presidential Statement (PRST) without formally discussing Nepal. During subsequent conversations with Mission staff, however, Secretariat officials confirmed that UNSC authorization -- most likely a resolution -- would be required for the UN to undertake such a mission. They said the Nepali PermRep had assured the Secretariat that the Government of Nepal (GON) would submit a formal request for assistance to the UN the week of June 26. End Summary.

[¶](#)2. (SBU) Poloff met Indian Mission Political MinCouns Harsh Shringla on June 20, at Shringla's request, to discuss possible UN involvement in Nepal. Characterizing coordination between the U.S. and India on Nepal in the past several months as positive, Shringla said New Delhi had instructed him to engage the U.S. on a possible role for the UN before contacting the Secretariat or other delegations. He noted with some exasperation that the GON had reached an eight-point understanding with the Maoists on June 16 to dissolve parliament and form an interim government with Maoist participation (ref A) -- without sufficient consultation with either the Nepali political class or India -- and reluctantly admitted that "a third party" would be needed to ensure that the Maoists disarm before they enter government. Since neither India nor third countries could fill that role, the UN would have to step in.

India Supports UN Role in Maoist DDR...

[¶](#)3. (SBU) Shringla said India would support a limited role for the UN in supervising and monitoring Maoist disarmament. He conceded that the eight-point understanding only refers to UN "management" of arms and asserts that Maoist and Nepalese Army arms should be treated the same way, but he said India was troubled by this lack of specificity and implied parity between the Maoists and the GON. India, Shringla averred,

would need "assurances" that the Maoists would not be able to resume violence if participation in the political process proves unsatisfactory. Although he predicted the interim government would not be formed for 3-4 months, Shringla said the UN would have to move quickly to ensure the disarmament process can be completed in this timeframe. He agreed that a speedy deployment of monitors would likely mean that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) would have to assume responsibility for logistics, rather than the Geneva-based Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which supports the OHCHR office in Nepal.

...But is Cautious About UNSC Involvement

¶4. (SBU) Although India wants the UN to take on this new task and do it quickly, Shringla continued, it would greatly prefer to avoid adding Nepal to the agenda of the UN Security Council for discussion. He said New Delhi is concerned that Council discussion of Nepal could lead the UN to take on a broader role in the peace process than necessary and set a precedent for broader UNSC involvement in other regional issues such as Kashmir. Instead, if UNSC authorization is needed for such a mission, he suggested that the Council could adopt a Presidential Statement (PRST) authorizing SYG Annan to create a small political mission and deploy monitors without formally adding Nepal to its agenda. (Note: USUN believes the Council would have to put Nepal on its agenda to adopt even a PRST. End Note.) Alternatively, the OHCHR mission in Nepal could expand its mandate and thereby preclude a role for the UNSC, but the UN would still need to ensure the job is done in 3-4 months. If the OHCHR mandate is expanded, Shringla agreed that the mission would not be able to draw on funding from assessed contributions for UNSC-authorized peacekeeping operations. In that case, he

predicted India would be willing to make a significant contribution to a voluntary fund to fund such an operation. After some probing, Shringla implied India would be flexible on the issue of how the UN mission is authorized, but it would greatly prefer to "avoid the UNSC route."

Secretariat Speculates UNSCR Will Be Necessary

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¶5. (SBU) During a conversation with PolMinCouns on other issues June 23, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi speculated that a UNSC resolution would be necessary for the Secretariat to deploy personnel to Nepal to monitor Maoist and GON arms. He cautioned that the scope of the UN's mission would depend on the GON's request -- and an agreement between the Maoists and the GON on arms management -- but he noted that DPKO military planner Colonel Ian Sinclair had developed options for a monitoring missions during his visit to Nepal several weeks ago (Note: Sinclair returned to New York June 27; USUN will arrange a meeting with him as soon as possible. End Note.). Pending the request from the Nepalis, Annabi also said the Secretariat is considering shifting responsibility for Nepal from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to DPKO.

¶6. (SBU) DPA Asia and Middle East Division Director Michael Williams confirmed to DeputyPolCouns on June 27 that UNSC authorization would be necessary for the UN to launch an arms monitoring and electoral assistance mission in Nepal. He reported that the Nepali PermRep had assured DPA U/SYG Gambari that the GON would send the UN a formal request for assistance during the week of June 26. Speaking about the peace process in Nepal, Williams expressed concern that PM Koirala was making too many concessions to the Maoists due to his advanced age and ill-health.

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